| 번역해볼만 한 문장입니다. |
by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
translated by Robert Latta
1. The Monad, of which we shall here speak, is nothing but a
simple substance, which enters into compounds. By 'simple' is meant
'without parts.' (Theod. 10.)
---여기서 다루는 "단자"란 합성체를 이루는 단순한 실체이외의 아무 것도 아니다.
즉,부분이 없는 원소[단일성]라고 부르는 것이다.
2. And there must be simple substances, since there are compounds;
for a compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simple
---그리고 단순한 실체가 있슴이 틀림없다.왜냐하면 합성체가 있기 때문이다.
즉,합셩체라고 하는 것은 단순한 것들의 집합체거나 수집물이며 그외의 아무 것도 아니다.
3. Now where there are no parts, there can be neither extension
nor form [figure] nor divisibility. These Monads are the real atoms of
nature and, in a word, the elements of things.
---그렇다면 부분이 없는 곳에는 넓이도 없고 모양도 없으며 나누어짐도 가능하지 않다.
그러므로 이러한 단자들은 자연의 확실한 원자들이며 언어로는 사물들의 요소인 것이다.
4. No dissolution of these elements need be feared, and there is
no conceivable way in which a simple substance can be destroyed by
natural means. (Theod. 89.)
---더우기 단자의 나누어짐이 가능하지 않다는 데에 대해서는 의문이 없다.
그리고 자연의 과정에서 소멸할 수 있는 단순한 실체에 대해서 생각할 수 있는 방법이 없다.
5. For the same reason there is no conceivable way in which a simple
substance can come into being by natural means, since it cannot be
formed by the combination of parts [composition].
---꼭 같은 이유로서 자연과정에서 시작될 수 있는 단순한 실체에 대해서는 생각할 수 있는 방법이 없다.
왜냐하면 단순한 실체는 합성의 수단에 의해서 형성되어질 수 없기 때문이다.
6. Thus it may be said that a Monad can only come into being or come
to an end all at once; that is to say, it can come into being only
by creation and come to an end only by annihilation, while that
which is compound comes into being or comes to an end by parts.
---이처름 단자들은 오직 시작과 끝이 동시라고 불리어질 수 없다.
즉 합성이 부분들로써 시작하고 끝맺는 것인 반면 단자들은 오직 창조에 의해서 시작될 수 있고
섬멸에 의해서 끝맺을 수 없다는 말이다.
7. Further, there is no way of explaining how a Monad can be altered
in quality or internally changed by any other created thing; since
it is impossible to change the place of anything in it or to
conceive in it any internal motion which could be produced,
directed, increased or diminished therein, although all this is
possible in the case of compounds, in which there are changes among
the parts. The Monads have no windows, through which anything could
come in or go out. Accidents cannot separate themselves from
substances nor go about outside of them, as the 'sensible species'
of the Scholastics used to do. Thus neither substance nor accident can
come into a Monad from outside.
---어떻게 단자가 어떤 다른 창조된 사물에 의해서 그 자신이 바꾸어질 수 있거나 변화될 수 있는 가를
밝혀내는 방법은 없다.왜냐하면 단자는 그 속에 어떤 것을 옮겨 놓는다는 것이 가능하지 않기 때문이다.
그리고 합성체들 속에서 일어날 수 있는 것처름 부분들이 장소를 바꾸는 곳에서 어떤 내적인 운동이
시작되고,지시되고,증가되고 혹은 감소된다는 가능성에 대한 생각은 가능하지 않다
단자들은 창이 없다.
어떤 것에 의해서도 들어오거나 나갈 수 없다.우유성은 분리될 수 없다.
또한 스콜라 철학자들이 사용하는 <감각할 수 있는 종>처름 외부실체들을 배회할 수도 없다.
이와같이 실체도 우유성도 외부로 부터 한 단자에 들어갈 수 없다.
8. Yet the Monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would not
even be existing things. And if simple substances did not differ in
quality, there would be absolutely no means of perceiving any change
in things. For what is in the compound can come only from the simple
elements it contains, and the Monads, if they had no qualities,
would be indistinguishable from one another, since they do not
differ in quantity. Consequently, space being a plenum, each part of
space would always receive, in any motion, exactly the equivalent of
what it already had, and no one state of things would be discernible
---아뭏든 단자들은 어떠한 성질을 가져야 한다.그렇지 않고서는 단자들이 결코 존재하는 것일 수 없다.
그리고 만일 단순한 실체들이 그들의 성질로서 차이가 나지 않는다면 사물에 있어서 어떠한 변화도 생각할 방법이 없을 것이다.왜냐하면 합성체속에 있는 것은 그것들의 단순한 성분으로부터만 나올 수 있기때문이다.또한 단자들이 성질이 없다면 그들은 다른 것과 비교할 수 없을 것이다. 왜냐하면 단자들이 양에 있어서도 역시 차이가 나지 않기 때문이다. 그 결과로 운동이 일어났을 때 공간에 물질이 충만해 있음을 가정한다면 각각의 장소는 항상 그가 이전에 갖고 있던 바의 동등한 양을 얻었을 뿐이다.
그래서 사물들의 한 상태는 다른 것들로 부터 구별할 수 없게 된다.
9. Indeed, each Monad must be different from every other. For in
nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in
which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a
difference founded upon an intrinsic quality [denomination].
---참으로 모든 단자는 여러 다른 것들과 차이가 있슴이 틀림없다.왜냐하면 자연에는 엄밀하게
꼭같은 두존재가 결코 없기 때문이며 내부에 있는 어떤 차이점이나 본질적인 성질을 이루고 있는
것을 찾는다는 것은 가능하지 않기 때문이다.
10. I assume also as admitted that every created being, and
consequently the created Monad, is subject to change, and further that
this change is continuous in each.
---나는 역시 모든 창조된 사물을 승인한 것으로 받아들인다.
그리고 결과적으로 창조된 단자도 역시 마찬가지라는 것은 주체를 바꾼것이며 이러한 전환은 정말로
각 사물에 있어서도 존속한다.
11. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural
changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an
external cause can have no influence upon their inner being. (Theod.
---우라가 말해온 바로서 단자들의 자연적인 변화는 한 내적인 원리로 부터 온다는 결과가 된다.
왜냐하면 외적인 원인이 그들의 내적인 존재에 영향을 줄 수 없기 때문이다.
12. But, besides the principle of the change, there must be a
particular series of changes [un detail de ce qui change], which
constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and variety of the
---그러나 말하자면 단순한 실체들의 특수화와 다양화를 이루는 그 변화의 원리이외에도
변화들 속에는 변이가 있슴이 분명하다.
13. This particular series of changes should involve a
multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in that which is simple. For, as
every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and
something remains unchanged; and consequently a simple substance
must be affected and related in many ways, although it has no parts.
---이 변이는 단일서이나 단순성내부에 한 다수성을 포함하지 않으면 안된다.
왜냐하면 모든 자연적인 변화는 정도와 어떤 변화와 어떤 지속에 의해서 장소를 취하기 때문이다
그리고 결과적으로 단순성은 비록 부분들을 갖고 있지 않다고 해도 의향과 관계의 큰 수를 포함하지
14. The passing condition, which involves and represents a
multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in the simple substance, is
nothing but what is called Perception, which is to be distinguished
from Apperception or Consciousness, as will afterwards appear. In this
matter the Cartesian view is extremely defective, for it treats as
non-existent those perceptions of which we are not consciously
aware. This has also led them to believe that minds [esprits] alone
are Monads, and that there are no souls of animals nor other
Entelechies. Thus, like the crowd, they have failed to distinguish
between a prolonged unconsciousness and absolute death, which has made
them fall again into the Scholastic prejudice of souls entirely
separate [from bodies], and has even confirmed ill-balanced minds in
the opinion that souls are mortal.
15. The activity of the internal principle which produces change
or passage from one perception to another may be called Appetition. It
is true that desire [l'appetit] cannot always fully attain to the
whole perception at which it aims, but it always obtains some of it
and attains to new perceptions.
16. We have in ourselves experience of a multiplicity in simple
substance, when we find that the least thought of which we are
conscious involves variety in its object. Thus all those who admit
that the soul is a simple substance should admit this multiplicity
in the Monad; and M. Bayle ought not to have found any difficulty in
this, as he has done in his Dictionary, article 'Rorarius.'
17. Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which
depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to
say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a
machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it
might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same
proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being
so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work
one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.
Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a
machine, that perception must be sought for. Further, nothing but this
(namely, perceptions and their changes) can be found in a simple
substance. It is also in this alone that all the internal activities
of simple substances can consist. (Theod. Pref. [E. 474; G. vi. 37].)
18. All simple substances or created Monads might be called
Entelechies, for they have in them a certain perfection (echousi to
enteles); they have a certain self-sufficiency (autarkeia) which makes
them the sources of their internal activities and, so to speak,
incorporeal automata. (Theod. 87.)
19. If we are to give the name of Soul to everything which has
perceptions and desires [appetits] in the general sense which I have
explained, then all simple substances or created Monads might be
called souls; but as feeling [le sentiment] is something more than a
bare perception, I think it right that the general name of Monads or
Entelechies should suffice for simple substances which have perception
only, and that the name of Souls should be given only to those in
which perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory.
20. For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we
remember nothing and have no distinguishable perception; as when we
fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a profound dreamless
sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a
bare Monad; but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out
of it, the soul is something more than a bare Monad. (Theod. 64.)
21. And it does not follow that in this state the simple substance
is without any perception. That, indeed, cannot be, for the reasons
already given; for it cannot perish, and it cannot continue to exist
without being affected in some way, and this affection is nothing
but its perception. But when there is a great multitude of little
perceptions, in which there is nothing distinct, one is stunned; as
when one turns continuously round in the same way several times in
succession, whence comes a giddiness which may make us swoon, and
which keeps us from distinguishing anything. Death can for a time
put animals into this condition.
22. And as every present state of a simple substance is naturally
a consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present
is big with its future; (Theod. 350.)
23. And as, on waking from stupor, we are conscious of our
perceptions, we must have had perceptions immediately before we awoke,
although we were not at all conscious of them; for one perception
can in a natural way come only from another perception, as a motion
can in a natural way come only from a motion. (Theod. 401-403.)
24. It thus appears that if we had in our perceptions nothing marked
and, so to speak, striking and highly-flavoured, we should always be
in a state of stupor. And this is the state in which the bare Monads
25. We see also that nature has given heightened perceptions to
animals, from the care she has taken to provide them with organs,
which collect numerous rays of light, or numerous undulations of the
air, in order, by uniting them, to make them have greater effect.
Something similar to this takes place in smell, in taste and in touch,
and perhaps in a number of other senses, which are unknown to us.
And I will explain presently how that which takes place in the soul
represents what happens in the bodily organs.
26. Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecutiveness, which
resembles [imite] reason, but which is to be distinguished from it.
Thus we see that when animals have a perception of something which
strikes them and of which they have formerly had a similar perception,
they are led, by means of representation in their memory, to expect
what was combined with the thing in this previous perception, and they
come to have feelings similar to those they had on the former
occasion. For instance, when a stick is shown to dogs, they remember
the pain it has caused them, and howl and run away. (Theod. Discours
de la Conformite, &c., ss. 65.)
27. And the strength of the mental image which impresses and moves
them comes either from the magnitude or the number of the preceding
perceptions. For often a strong impression produces all at once the
same effect as a long-formed habit, or as many and oft-repeated
28. In so far as the concatenation of their perceptions is due to
the principle of memory alone, men act like the lower animals,
resembling the empirical physicians, whose methods are those of mere
practice without theory. Indeed, in three-fourths of our actions we
are nothing but empirics. For instance, when we expect that there will
be daylight to-morrow, we do so empirically, because it has always
so happened until now. It is only the astronomer who thinks it on
29. But it is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that
distinguishes us from the mere animals and gives us Reason and the
sciences, raising us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God. And
it is this in us that is called the rational soul or mind [esprit].
30. It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths, and
through their abstract expression, that we rise to acts of
reflexion, which make us think of what is called I, and observe that
this or that is within us: and thus, thinking of ourselves, we think
of being, of substance, of the simple and the compound, of the
immaterial, and of God Himself, conceiving that what is limited in
us is in Him without limits. And these acts of reflexion furnish the
chief objects of our reasonings. (Theod. Pref. [E. 469; G. vi. 27].)
31. Our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, that of
contradiction, in virtue of which we judge false that which involves a
contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to
the false; (Theod. 44, 169.)
32. And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that
there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there
be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise,
although these reasons usually cannot be known by us. (Theod. 44,
33. There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and those
of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is
impossible: truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is
possible. When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by
analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths, until we
come to those which are primary. (Theod. 170, 174, 189, 280-282,
367. Abrege, Object. 3.)
34. It is thus that in Mathematics speculative Theorems and
practical Canons are reduced by analysis to Definitions, Axioms and
35. In short, there are simple ideas, of which no definition can
be given; there are also axioms and postulates, in a word, primary
principles, which cannot be proved, and indeed have no need of
proof; and these are identical propositions, whose opposite involves
an express contradiction. (Theod. 36, 37, 44, 45, 49, 52, 121-122,
36. But there must also be a sufficient reason for contingent truths
or truths of fact, that is to say, for the sequence or connexion of
the things which are dispersed throughout the universe of created
beings, in which the analyzing into particular reasons might go on
into endless detail, because of the immense variety of things in
nature and the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of
present and past forms and motions which go to make up the efficient
cause of my present writing; and there is an infinity of minute
tendencies and dispositions of my soul, which go to make its final
37. And as all this detail again involves other prior or more
detailed contingent things, each of which still needs a similar
analysis to yield its reason, we are no further forward: and the
sufficient or final reason must be outside of the sequence or series
of particular contingent things, however infinite this series may be.
38. Thus the final reason of things must be in a necessary
substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists only
eminently, as in its source; and this substance we call God. (Theod.
39. Now as this substance is a sufficient reason of all this variety
of particulars, which are also connected together throughout; there is
only one God, and this God is sufficient.
40. We may also hold that this supreme substance, which is unique,
universal and necessary, nothing outside of it being independent of
it,- this substance, which is a pure sequence of possible being,
must be illimitable and must contain as much reality as is possible.
41. Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect; for perfection
is nothing but amount of positive reality, in the strict sense,
leaving out of account the limits or bounds in things which are
limited. And where there are no bounds, that is to say in God,
perfection is absolutely infinite. (Theod. 22, Pref. [E. 469 a; G. vi.
42. It follows also that created beings derive their perfections
from the influence of God, but that their imperfections come from
their own nature, which is incapable of being without limits. For it
is in this that they differ from God. An instance of this original
imperfection of created beings may be seen in the natural inertia of
bodies. (Theod. 20, 27-30, 153, 167, 377 sqq.)
43. It is farther true that in God there is not only the source of
existences but also that of essences, in so far as they are real, that
is to say, the source of what is real in the possible. For the
understanding of God is the region of eternal truths or of the ideas
on which they depend, and without Him there would be nothing real in
the possibilities of things, and not only would there be nothing in
existence, but nothing would even be possible. (Theod. 20.)
44. For if there is a reality in essences or possibilities, or
rather in eternal truths, this reality must needs be founded in
something existing and actual, and consequently in the existence of
the necessary Being, in whom essence involves existence, or in whom to
be possible is to be actual. (Theod. 184-189, 335.)
45. Thus God alone (or the necessary Being) has this prerogative
that He must necessarily exist, if He is possible. And as nothing
can interfere with the possibility of that which involves no limits,
no negation and consequently no contradiction, this [His
possibility] is sufficient of itself to make known the existence of
God a priori. We have thus proved it, through the reality of eternal
truths. But a little while ago we proved it also a posteriori, since
there exist contingent beings, which can have their final or
sufficient reason only in the necessary Being, which has the reason of
its existence in itself.
46. We must not, however, imagine, as some do, that eternal
truths, being dependent on God, are arbitrary and depend on His
will, as Descartes, and afterwards M. Poiret, appear to have held.
That is true only of contingent truths, of which the principle is
fitness [convenance] or choice of the best, whereas necessary truths
depend solely on His understanding and are its inner object. (Theod.
180-184, 185, 335, 351, 380.)
47. Thus God alone is the primary unity or original simple
substance, of which all created or derivative Monads are products
and have their birth, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of
the Divinity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of
the created being, of whose essence it is to have limits. (Theod.
382-391, 398, 395.)
48. In God there is Power, which is the source of all, also
Knowledge, whose content is the variety of the ideas, and finally
Will, which makes changes or products according to the principle of
the best. (Theod. 7, 149, 150.) These characteristics correspond to
what in the created Monads forms the ground or basis, to the faculty
of Perception and to the faculty of Appetition. But in God these
attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect; and in the created
Monads or the Entelechies (or perfectihabiae, as Hermolaus Barbarus
translated the word) there are only imitations of these attributes,
according to the degree of perfection of the Monad. (Theod. 87.)
49. A created thing is said to act outwardly in so far as it has
perfection, and to suffer [or be passive, patir] in relation to
another, in so far as it is imperfect. Thus activity [action] is
attributed to a Monad, in so far as it has distinct perceptions, and
passivity [passion] in so far as its perceptions are confused. (Theod.
32, 66, 386.)
50. And one created thing is more perfect than another, in this,
that there is found in the more perfect that which serves to explain a
priori what takes place in the less perfect, and it is on this account
that the former is said to act upon the latter.
51. But in simple substances the influence of one Monad upon another
is only ideal, and it can have its effect only through the mediation
of God, in so far as in the ideas of God any Monad rightly claims that
God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should
have regard to it. For since one created Monad cannot have any
physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only by this
means that the one can be dependent upon the other. (Theod. 9, 54, 65,
66, 201. Abrege, Object. 3.)
52. Accordingly, among created things, activities and passivities
are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each
reasons which oblige Him to adapt the other to it, and consequently
what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of
view; active in so far as what we distinctly know in it serves to
explain [rendre raison de] what takes place in another, and passive in
so far as the explanation [raison] of what takes place in it is to
be found in that which is distinctly known in another. (Theod. 66.)
53. Now, as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite number of
possible universes, and as only one of them can be actual, there
must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which leads Him
to decide upon one rather than another. (Theod. 8, 10, 44, 173, 196
sqq., 225, 414-416.)
54. And this reason can be found only in the fitness [convenance],
or in the degrees of perfection, that these worlds possess, since each
possible thing has the right to aspire to existence in proportion to
the amount of perfection it contains in germ. (Theod. 74, 167, 350,
201, 130, 352, 345 sqq., 354.)
55. Thus the actual existence of the best that wisdom makes known to
God is due to this, that His goodness makes Him choose it, and His
power makes Him produce it. (Theod. 8, 78, 80, 84, 119, 204, 206, 208.
Abrege, Object. 1 and 8.)
56. Now this connexion or adaptation of all created things to each
and of each to all, means that each simple substance has relations
which express all the others, and, consequently, that it is a
perpetual living mirror of the universe. (Theod. 130, 360.)
57. And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears
quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects
[perspectivement]; even so, as a result of the infinite number of
simple substances, it is as if there were so many different universes,
which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects [perspectives] of a single
universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad.
58. And by this means there is obtained as great variety as
possible, along with the greatest possible order; that is to say, it
is the way to get as much perfection as possible. (Theod. 120, 124,
241 sqq., 214, 243, 275.)
59. Besides, no hypothesis but this (which I venture to call proved)
fittingly exalts the greatness of God; and this Monsieur Bayle
recognized when, in his Dictionary (article Rorarius), he raised
objections to it, in which indeed he was inclined to think that I
was attributing too much to God- more than it is possible to
attribute. But he was unable to give any reason which could show the
impossibility of this universal harmony, according to which every
substance exactly expresses all others through the relations it has
60. Further, in what I have just said there may be seen the
reasons a priori why things could not be otherwise than they are.
For God in regulating the whole has had regard to each part, and in
particular to each Monad, whose nature being to represent, nothing can
confine it to the representing of only one part of things; though it
is true that this representation is merely confused as regards the
variety of particular things [le detail] in the whole universe, and
can be distinct only as regards a small part of things, namely,
those which are either nearest or greatest in relation to each of
the Monads; otherwise each Monad would be a deity. It is not as
regards their object, but as regards the different ways in which
they have knowledge of their object, that the Monads are limited. In a
confused way they all strive after [vont a] the infinite, the whole;
but they are limited and differentiated through the degrees of their
61. And compounds are in this respect analogous with [symbolisent
avec] simple substances. For all is a plenum (and thus all matter is
connected together) and in the plenum every motion has an effect
upon distant bodies in proportion to their distance, so that each body
not only is affected by those which are in contact with it and in some
way feels the effect of everything that happens to them, but also is
mediately affected by bodies adjoining those with which it itself is
in immediate contact. Wherefore it follows that this
inter-communication of things extends to any distance, however
great. And consequently every body feels the effect of all that
takes place in the universe, so that he who sees all might read in
each what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened or shall
happen, observing in the present that which is far off as well in time
as in place: sympnoia panta, as Hippocrates said. But a soul can
read in itself only that which is there represented distinctly; it
cannot all at once unroll everything that is enfolded in it, for its
complexity is infinite.
62. Thus, although each created Monad represents the whole universe,
it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it,
and of which it is the entelechy; and as this body expresses the whole
universe through the connexion of all matter in the plenum, the soul
also represents the whole universe in representing this body, which
belongs to it in a special way. (Theod. 400.)
63. The body belonging to a Monad (which is its entelechy or its
soul) constitutes along with the entelechy what may be called a living
being, and along with the soul what is called an animal. Now this body
of living being or of an animal is always organic; for, as every Monad
is, in its own way, a mirror of the universe, and as the universe is
ruled according to a perfect order, there must also be order in that
which represents it, i.e. in the perceptions of the soul, and
consequently there must be order in the body, through which the
universe is represented in the soul. (Theod. 403.)
64. Thus the organic body of each living being is a kind of divine
machine or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all
artificial automata. For a machine made by the skill of man is not a
machine in each of its parts. For instance, the tooth of a brass wheel
has parts or fragments which for us are not artificial products, and
which do not have the special characteristics of the machine, for they
give no indication of the use for which the wheel was intended. But
the machines of nature, namely, living bodies, are still machines in
their smallest parts ad infinitum. It is this that constitutes the
difference between nature and art, that is to say, between the
divine art and ours. (Theod. 134, 146, 194, 403.)
65. And the Author of nature has been able to employ this divine and
infinitely wonderful power of art, because each portion of matter is
not only infinitely divisible, as the ancients observed, but is also
actually subdivided without end, each part into further parts, of
which each has some motion of its own; otherwise it would be
impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe.
(Theod. Prelim., Disc. de la Conform. 70, and 195.)
66. Whence it appears that in the smallest particle of matter
there is a world of creatures, living beings, animals, entelechies,
67. Each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of
plants and like a pond full of fishes. But each branch of every plant,
each member of every animal, each drop of its liquid parts is also
some such garden or pond.
68. And though the earth and the air which are between the plants of
the garden, or the water which is between the fish of the pond, be
neither plant nor fish; yet they also contain plants and fishes, but
mostly so minute as to be imperceptible to us.
69. Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in
the universe, no chaos, no confusion save in appearance, somewhat as
it might appear to be in a pond at a distance, in which one would
see a confused movement and, as it were, a swarming of fish in the
pond, without separately distinguishing the fish themselves. (Theod.
Pref. [E. 475 b; 477 b; G. vi. 40, 44].)
70. Hence it appears that each living body has a dominant entelechy,
which in an animal is the soul; but the members of this living body
are full of other living beings, plants, animals, each of which has
also its dominant entelechy or soul.
71. But it must not be imagined, as has been done by some who have
misunderstood my thought, that each soul has a quantity or portion
of matter belonging exclusively to itself or attached to it for
ever, and that it consequently owns other inferior living beings,
which are devoted for ever to its service. For all bodies are in a
perpetual flux like rivers, and parts are entering into them and
passing out of them continually.
72. Thus the soul changes its body only by degrees, little by
little, so that it is never all at once deprived of all its organs;
and there is often metamorphosis in animals, but never
metempsychosis or transmigration of souls; nor are there souls
entirely separate [from bodies] nor unembodied spirits [genies sans
corps]. God alone is completely without body. (Theod. 90, 124.)
73. It also follows from this that there never is absolute birth
[generation] nor complete death, in the strict sense, consisting in
the separation of the soul from the body. What we call births
[generations] are developments and growths, while what we call
deaths are envelopments and diminutions.
74. Philosophers have been much perplexed about the origin of forms,
entelechies, or souls; but nowadays it has become known, through
careful studies of plants, insects, and animals, that the organic
bodies of nature are never products of chaos or putrefaction, but
always come from seeds, in which there was undoubtedly some
preformation; and it is held that not only the organic body was
already there before conception, but also a soul in this body, and, in
short, the animal itself; and that by means of conception this
animal has merely been prepared for the great transformation
involved in its becoming an animal of another kind. Something like
this is indeed seen apart from birth [generation], as when worms
become flies and caterpillars become butterflies. (Theod. 86, 89.
Pref. [E. 475 b; G. vi. 40 sqq.]; 90, 187, 188, 403, 86, 397.)
75. The animals, of which some are raised by means of conception
to the rank of larger animals, may be called spermatic, but those
among them which are not so raised but remain in their own kind
(that is, the majority) are born, multiply, and are destroyed like the
large animals, and it is only a few chosen ones [elus] that pass to
a greater theatre.
76. But this is only half of the truth, and accordingly I hold
that if an animal never comes into being by natural means
[naturellement], no more does it come to an end by natural means;
and that not only will there be no birth [generation], but also no
complete destruction or death in the strict sense. And these
reasonings, made a posteriori and drawn from experience are in perfect
agreement with my principles deduced a priori, as above. (Theod. 90.)
77. Thus it may be said that not only the soul (mirror of an
indestructible universe) is indestructible, but also the animal
itself, though its mechanism [machine] may often perish in part and
take off or put on an organic slough [des depouilles organiques].
78. These principles have given me a way of explaining naturally the
union or rather the mutual agreement [conformite] of the soul and
the organic body. The soul follows its own laws, and the body likewise
follows its own laws; and they agree with each other in virtue of
the pre-established harmony between all substances, since they are all
representations of one and the same universe. (Pref. [E. 475 a; G. vi.
39]; Theod. 340, 352, 353, 358.)
79. Souls act according to the laws of final causes through
appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of
efficient causes or motions. And the two realms, that of efficient
causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with one another.
80. Descartes recognized that souls cannot impart any force to
bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in
matter. Nevertheless he was of opinion that the soul could change
the direction of bodies. But that is because in his time it was not
known that there is a law of nature which affirms also the
conservation of the same total direction in matter. Had Descartes
noticed this he would have come upon my system of pre-established
harmony. (Pref. [E. 477 a; G. vi. 44]; Theod. 22, 59, 60, 61, 63,
66, 345, 346 sqq., 354, 355.)
81. According to this system bodies act as if (to suppose the
impossible) there were no souls, and souls act as if there were no
bodies, and both act as if each influenced the other.
82. As regards minds [esprits] or rational souls, though I find that
what I have just been saying is true of all living beings and
animals (namely that animals and souls come into being when the
world begins and no more come to an end that the world does), yet
there is this peculiarity in rational animals, that their spermatic
animalcules, so long as they are only spermatic, have merely
ordinary or sensuous [sensitive] souls; but when those which are
chosen [elus], so to speak, attain to human nature through an actual
conception, their sensuous souls are raised to the rank of reason
and to the prerogative of minds [esprits]. (Theod. 91, 397.)
83. Among other differences which exist between ordinary souls and
minds [esprits], some of which differences I have already noted, there
is also this: that souls in general are living mirrors or images of
the universe of created things, but that minds are also images of
the Deity or Author of nature Himself, capable of knowing the system
of the universe, and to some extent of imitating it through
architectonic ensamples [echantillons], each mind being like a small
divinity in its own sphere. (Theod. 147.)
84. It is this that enables spirits [or minds- esprits] to enter
into a kind of fellowship with God, and brings it about that in
relation to them He is not only what an inventor is to his machine
(which is the relation of God to other created things), but also
what a prince is to his subjects, and, indeed, what a father is to his
85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the totality [assemblage]
of all spirits [esprits] must compose the City of God, that is to say,
the most perfect State that is possible, under the most perfect of
Monarchs. (Theod. 146; Abrege, Object. 2.)
86. This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral
world in the natural world, and is the most exalted and most divine
among the works of God; and it is in it that the glory of God really
consists, for He would have no glory were not His greatness and His
goodness known and admired by spirits [esprits]. It is also in
relation to this divine City that God specially has goodness, while
His wisdom and His power are manifested everywhere. (Theod. 146;
Abrege, Object. 2.)
87. As we have shown above that there is a perfect harmony between
the two realms in nature, one of efficient, and the other of final
causes, we should here notice also another harmony between the
physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace, that is to say,
between God, considered as Architect of the mechanism [machine] of the
universe and God considered as Monarch of the divine City of spirits
[esprits]. (Theod. 62, 74, 118, 248, 112, 130, 247.)
88. A result of this harmony is that things lead to grace by the
very ways of nature, and that this globe, for instance, must be
destroyed and renewed by natural means at the very time when the
government of spirits requires it, for the punishment of some and
the reward of others. (Theod. 18 sqq., 110, 244, 245, 340.)
89. It may also be said that God as Architect satisfies in all
respects God as Lawgiver, and thus that sins must bear their penalty
with them, through the order of nature, and even in virtue of the
mechanical structure of things; and similarly that noble actions
will attain their rewards by ways which, on the bodily side, are
mechanical, although this cannot and ought not always to happen
90. Finally, under this perfect government no good action would be
unrewarded and no bad one unpunished, and all should issue in the
well-being of the good, that is to say, of those who are not
malcontents in this great state, but who trust in Providence, after
having done their duty, and who love and imitate, as is meet, the
Author of all good, finding pleasure in the contemplation of His
perfections, as is the way of genuine 'pure love,' which takes
pleasure in the happiness of the beloved. This it is which leads
wise and virtuous people to devote their energies to everything
which appears in harmony with the presumptive or antecedent will of
God, and yet makes them content with what God actually brings to
pass by His secret, consequent and positive [decisive] will,
recognizing that if we could sufficiently understand the order of
the universe, we should find that it exceeds all the desires of the
wisest men, and that it is impossible to make it better than it is,
not only as a whole and in general but also for ourselves in
particular, if we are attached, as we ought to be, to the Author of
all, not only as to the architect and efficient cause of our being,
but as to our master and to the final cause, which ought to be the
whole aim of our will, and which can alone make our happiness. (Theod.
134, 278. Pref. [E. 469; G. vi. 27, 28].)