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 라이프니쯔의 "단자론" 원문

번역해볼만 한 문장입니다.
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                                     1898

                                 THE MONADOLOGY

                          by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

                           translated by Robert Latta



  1. The Monad, of which we shall here speak, is nothing but a

simple substance, which enters into compounds. By 'simple' is meant

'without parts.' (Theod. 10.)

---여기서 다루는 "단자"란 합성체를 이루는 단순한 실체이외의 아무 것도 아니다.
즉,부분이 없는 원소[단일성]라고 부르는 것이다.

  2. And there must be simple substances, since there are compounds;

for a compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simple

things.

---그리고 단순한 실체가 있슴이 틀림없다.왜냐하면 합성체가 있기 때문이다.
즉,합셩체라고 하는 것은 단순한 것들의 집합체거나 수집물이며 그외의 아무 것도 아니다.

  3. Now where there are no parts, there can be neither extension

nor form [figure] nor divisibility. These Monads are the real atoms of

nature and, in a word, the elements of things.

---그렇다면 부분이  없는 곳에는 넓이도 없고 모양도 없으며 나누어짐도 가능하지 않다.
그러므로 이러한 단자들은 자연의 확실한 원자들이며 언어로는 사물들의 요소인 것이다.

  4. No dissolution of these elements need be feared, and there is

no conceivable way in which a simple substance can be destroyed by

natural means. (Theod. 89.)

---더우기 단자의 나누어짐이 가능하지 않다는 데에 대해서는 의문이 없다.
그리고 자연의 과정에서 소멸할 수 있는 단순한 실체에 대해서 생각할 수 있는 방법이 없다.

  5. For the same reason there is no conceivable way in which a simple

substance can come into being by natural means, since it cannot be

formed by the combination of parts [composition].

---꼭 같은 이유로서 자연과정에서 시작될 수 있는 단순한 실체에 대해서는 생각할 수 있는 방법이 없다.
왜냐하면 단순한 실체는 합성의 수단에 의해서 형성되어질 수 없기 때문이다.

  6. Thus it may be said that a Monad can only come into being or come

to an end all at once; that is to say, it can come into being only

by creation and come to an end only by annihilation, while that

which is compound comes into being or comes to an end by parts.

---이처름 단자들은 오직 시작과 끝이 동시라고 불리어질 수 없다.
즉 합성이 부분들로써 시작하고 끝맺는 것인 반면 단자들은 오직 창조에 의해서 시작될 수 있고
섬멸에 의해서 끝맺을 수 없다는 말이다.

  7. Further, there is no way of explaining how a Monad can be altered

in quality or internally changed by any other created thing; since

it is impossible to change the place of anything in it or to

conceive in it any internal motion which could be produced,

directed, increased or diminished therein, although all this is

possible in the case of compounds, in which there are changes among

the parts. The Monads have no windows, through which anything could

come in or go out. Accidents cannot separate themselves from

substances nor go about outside of them, as the 'sensible species'

of the Scholastics used to do. Thus neither substance nor accident can

come into a Monad from outside.

---어떻게 단자가 어떤 다른 창조된 사물에 의해서 그 자신이 바꾸어질 수 있거나 변화될 수 있는 가를
밝혀내는 방법은 없다.왜냐하면 단자는 그 속에 어떤 것을 옮겨 놓는다는 것이 가능하지 않기 때문이다.
그리고 합성체들 속에서 일어날 수 있는 것처름 부분들이 장소를 바꾸는 곳에서 어떤 내적인 운동이
시작되고,지시되고,증가되고 혹은 감소된다는 가능성에 대한 생각은 가능하지 않다
단자들은 창이 없다.
어떤 것에 의해서도 들어오거나 나갈 수 없다.우유성은 분리될 수 없다.
또한 스콜라 철학자들이 사용하는 <감각할 수 있는 종>처름 외부실체들을 배회할 수도 없다.
이와같이 실체도 우유성도 외부로 부터 한 단자에 들어갈 수 없다.


  8. Yet the Monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would not

even be existing things. And if simple substances did not differ in

quality, there would be absolutely no means of perceiving any change

in things. For what is in the compound can come only from the simple

elements it contains, and the Monads, if they had no qualities,

would be indistinguishable from one another, since they do not

differ in quantity. Consequently, space being a plenum, each part of

space would always receive, in any motion, exactly the equivalent of

what it already had, and no one state of things would be discernible

from another.

---아뭏든 단자들은 어떠한 성질을 가져야 한다.그렇지 않고서는 단자들이 결코 존재하는 것일 수 없다.
그리고 만일 단순한 실체들이 그들의 성질로서 차이가 나지 않는다면 사물에 있어서 어떠한 변화도 생각할 방법이 없을 것이다.왜냐하면 합성체속에 있는 것은 그것들의 단순한 성분으로부터만 나올 수 있기때문이다.또한 단자들이 성질이 없다면 그들은 다른 것과 비교할 수 없을 것이다. 왜냐하면 단자들이 양에 있어서도 역시 차이가 나지 않기 때문이다. 그 결과로 운동이 일어났을 때 공간에 물질이 충만해 있음을 가정한다면 각각의 장소는 항상 그가 이전에 갖고 있던 바의 동등한 양을 얻었을 뿐이다.
그래서 사물들의 한 상태는 다른 것들로 부터 구별할 수 없게 된다.

  9. Indeed, each Monad must be different from every other. For in

nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in

which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a

difference founded upon an intrinsic quality [denomination].

---참으로 모든 단자는 여러 다른 것들과 차이가 있슴이 틀림없다.왜냐하면 자연에는 엄밀하게
꼭같은 두존재가 결코 없기 때문이며 내부에 있는 어떤 차이점이나 본질적인 성질을 이루고 있는
것을 찾는다는 것은 가능하지 않기 때문이다.

  10. I assume also as admitted that every created being, and

consequently the created Monad, is subject to change, and further that

this change is continuous in each.

---나는 역시 모든 창조된 사물을 승인한 것으로 받아들인다.
그리고 결과적으로 창조된 단자도 역시 마찬가지라는 것은 주체를 바꾼것이며 이러한 전환은 정말로
각 사물에 있어서도 존속한다.

  11. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural

changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an

external cause can have no influence upon their inner being. (Theod.

396, 400.)

---우라가 말해온 바로서 단자들의 자연적인 변화는 한 내적인 원리로 부터 온다는 결과가 된다.
왜냐하면 외적인 원인이 그들의 내적인 존재에 영향을 줄 수 없기 때문이다.

  12. But, besides the principle of the change, there must be a

particular series of changes [un detail de ce qui change], which

constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and variety of the

simple substances.

---그러나 말하자면 단순한 실체들의 특수화와 다양화를 이루는 그 변화의 원리이외에도
변화들 속에는 변이가 있슴이 분명하다.

  13. This particular series of changes should involve a

multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in that which is simple. For, as

every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and

something remains unchanged; and consequently a simple substance

must be affected and related in many ways, although it has no parts.

---이 변이는 단일서이나 단순성내부에 한 다수성을 포함하지 않으면 안된다.
왜냐하면 모든 자연적인 변화는 정도와 어떤 변화와 어떤 지속에 의해서 장소를 취하기 때문이다
그리고 결과적으로 단순성은 비록 부분들을 갖고 있지 않다고 해도 의향과 관계의 큰 수를 포함하지
않으면 안된다.

  14. The passing condition, which involves and represents a

multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in the simple substance, is

nothing but what is called Perception, which is to be distinguished

from Apperception or Consciousness, as will afterwards appear. In this

matter the Cartesian view is extremely defective, for it treats as

non-existent those perceptions of which we are not consciously

aware. This has also led them to believe that minds [esprits] alone

are Monads, and that there are no souls of animals nor other

Entelechies. Thus, like the crowd, they have failed to distinguish

between a prolonged unconsciousness and absolute death, which has made

them fall again into the Scholastic prejudice of souls entirely

separate [from bodies], and has even confirmed ill-balanced minds in

the opinion that souls are mortal.

  15. The activity of the internal principle which produces change

or passage from one perception to another may be called Appetition. It

is true that desire [l'appetit] cannot always fully attain to the

whole perception at which it aims, but it always obtains some of it

and attains to new perceptions.

  16. We have in ourselves experience of a multiplicity in simple

substance, when we find that the least thought of which we are

conscious involves variety in its object. Thus all those who admit

that the soul is a simple substance should admit this multiplicity

in the Monad; and M. Bayle ought not to have found any difficulty in

this, as he has done in his Dictionary, article 'Rorarius.'

  17. Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which

depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to

say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a

machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it

might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same

proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being

so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work

one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception.

Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a

machine, that perception must be sought for. Further, nothing but this

(namely, perceptions and their changes) can be found in a simple

substance. It is also in this alone that all the internal activities

of simple substances can consist. (Theod. Pref. [E. 474; G. vi. 37].)

  18. All simple substances or created Monads might be called

Entelechies, for they have in them a certain perfection (echousi to

enteles); they have a certain self-sufficiency (autarkeia) which makes

them the sources of their internal activities and, so to speak,

incorporeal automata. (Theod. 87.)

  19. If we are to give the name of Soul to everything which has

perceptions and desires [appetits] in the general sense which I have

explained, then all simple substances or created Monads might be

called souls; but as feeling [le sentiment] is something more than a

bare perception, I think it right that the general name of Monads or

Entelechies should suffice for simple substances which have perception

only, and that the name of Souls should be given only to those in

which perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory.

  20. For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we

remember nothing and have no distinguishable perception; as when we

fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a profound dreamless

sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a

bare Monad; but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out

of it, the soul is something more than a bare Monad. (Theod. 64.)

  21. And it does not follow that in this state the simple substance

is without any perception. That, indeed, cannot be, for the reasons

already given; for it cannot perish, and it cannot continue to exist

without being affected in some way, and this affection is nothing

but its perception. But when there is a great multitude of little

perceptions, in which there is nothing distinct, one is stunned; as

when one turns continuously round in the same way several times in

succession, whence comes a giddiness which may make us swoon, and

which keeps us from distinguishing anything. Death can for a time

put animals into this condition.

  22. And as every present state of a simple substance is naturally

a consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present

is big with its future; (Theod. 350.)

  23. And as, on waking from stupor, we are conscious of our

perceptions, we must have had perceptions immediately before we awoke,

although we were not at all conscious of them; for one perception

can in a natural way come only from another perception, as a motion

can in a natural way come only from a motion. (Theod. 401-403.)

  24. It thus appears that if we had in our perceptions nothing marked

and, so to speak, striking and highly-flavoured, we should always be

in a state of stupor. And this is the state in which the bare Monads

are.

  25. We see also that nature has given heightened perceptions to

animals, from the care she has taken to provide them with organs,

which collect numerous rays of light, or numerous undulations of the

air, in order, by uniting them, to make them have greater effect.

Something similar to this takes place in smell, in taste and in touch,

and perhaps in a number of other senses, which are unknown to us.

And I will explain presently how that which takes place in the soul

represents what happens in the bodily organs.

  26. Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecutiveness, which

resembles [imite] reason, but which is to be distinguished from it.

Thus we see that when animals have a perception of something which

strikes them and of which they have formerly had a similar perception,

they are led, by means of representation in their memory, to expect

what was combined with the thing in this previous perception, and they

come to have feelings similar to those they had on the former

occasion. For instance, when a stick is shown to dogs, they remember

the pain it has caused them, and howl and run away. (Theod. Discours

de la Conformite, &c., ss. 65.)

  27. And the strength of the mental image which impresses and moves

them comes either from the magnitude or the number of the preceding

perceptions. For often a strong impression produces all at once the

same effect as a long-formed habit, or as many and oft-repeated

ordinary perceptions.

  28. In so far as the concatenation of their perceptions is due to

the principle of memory alone, men act like the lower animals,

resembling the empirical physicians, whose methods are those of mere

practice without theory. Indeed, in three-fourths of our actions we

are nothing but empirics. For instance, when we expect that there will

be daylight to-morrow, we do so empirically, because it has always

so happened until now. It is only the astronomer who thinks it on

rational grounds.

  29. But it is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that

distinguishes us from the mere animals and gives us Reason and the

sciences, raising us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God. And

it is this in us that is called the rational soul or mind [esprit].

  30. It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths, and

through their abstract expression, that we rise to acts of

reflexion, which make us think of what is called I, and observe that

this or that is within us: and thus, thinking of ourselves, we think

of being, of substance, of the simple and the compound, of the

immaterial, and of God Himself, conceiving that what is limited in

us is in Him without limits. And these acts of reflexion furnish the

chief objects of our reasonings. (Theod. Pref. [E. 469; G. vi. 27].)

  31. Our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, that of

contradiction, in virtue of which we judge false that which involves a

contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to

the false; (Theod. 44, 169.)

  32. And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that

there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there

be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise,

although these reasons usually cannot be known by us. (Theod. 44,

196.)

  33. There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and those

of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is

impossible: truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is

possible. When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by

analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths, until we

come to those which are primary. (Theod. 170, 174, 189, 280-282,

367. Abrege, Object. 3.)

  34. It is thus that in Mathematics speculative Theorems and

practical Canons are reduced by analysis to Definitions, Axioms and

Postulates.

  35. In short, there are simple ideas, of which no definition can

be given; there are also axioms and postulates, in a word, primary

principles, which cannot be proved, and indeed have no need of

proof; and these are identical propositions, whose opposite involves

an express contradiction. (Theod. 36, 37, 44, 45, 49, 52, 121-122,

337, 340-344.)

  36. But there must also be a sufficient reason for contingent truths

or truths of fact, that is to say, for the sequence or connexion of

the things which are dispersed throughout the universe of created

beings, in which the analyzing into particular reasons might go on

into endless detail, because of the immense variety of things in

nature and the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of

present and past forms and motions which go to make up the efficient

cause of my present writing; and there is an infinity of minute

tendencies and dispositions of my soul, which go to make its final

cause.

  37. And as all this detail again involves other prior or more

detailed contingent things, each of which still needs a similar

analysis to yield its reason, we are no further forward: and the

sufficient or final reason must be outside of the sequence or series

of particular contingent things, however infinite this series may be.

  38. Thus the final reason of things must be in a necessary

substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists only

eminently, as in its source; and this substance we call God. (Theod.

7.)

  39. Now as this substance is a sufficient reason of all this variety

of particulars, which are also connected together throughout; there is

only one God, and this God is sufficient.

  40. We may also hold that this supreme substance, which is unique,

universal and necessary, nothing outside of it being independent of

it,- this substance, which is a pure sequence of possible being,

must be illimitable and must contain as much reality as is possible.

  41. Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect; for perfection

is nothing but amount of positive reality, in the strict sense,

leaving out of account the limits or bounds in things which are

limited. And where there are no bounds, that is to say in God,

perfection is absolutely infinite. (Theod. 22, Pref. [E. 469 a; G. vi.

27].)

  42. It follows also that created beings derive their perfections

from the influence of God, but that their imperfections come from

their own nature, which is incapable of being without limits. For it

is in this that they differ from God. An instance of this original

imperfection of created beings may be seen in the natural inertia of

bodies. (Theod. 20, 27-30, 153, 167, 377 sqq.)

  43. It is farther true that in God there is not only the source of

existences but also that of essences, in so far as they are real, that

is to say, the source of what is real in the possible. For the

understanding of God is the region of eternal truths or of the ideas

on which they depend, and without Him there would be nothing real in

the possibilities of things, and not only would there be nothing in

existence, but nothing would even be possible. (Theod. 20.)

  44. For if there is a reality in essences or possibilities, or

rather in eternal truths, this reality must needs be founded in

something existing and actual, and consequently in the existence of

the necessary Being, in whom essence involves existence, or in whom to

be possible is to be actual. (Theod. 184-189, 335.)

  45. Thus God alone (or the necessary Being) has this prerogative

that He must necessarily exist, if He is possible. And as nothing

can interfere with the possibility of that which involves no limits,

no negation and consequently no contradiction, this [His

possibility] is sufficient of itself to make known the existence of

God a priori. We have thus proved it, through the reality of eternal

truths. But a little while ago we proved it also a posteriori, since

there exist contingent beings, which can have their final or

sufficient reason only in the necessary Being, which has the reason of

its existence in itself.

  46. We must not, however, imagine, as some do, that eternal

truths, being dependent on God, are arbitrary and depend on His

will, as Descartes, and afterwards M. Poiret, appear to have held.

That is true only of contingent truths, of which the principle is

fitness [convenance] or choice of the best, whereas necessary truths

depend solely on His understanding and are its inner object. (Theod.

180-184, 185, 335, 351, 380.)

  47. Thus God alone is the primary unity or original simple

substance, of which all created or derivative Monads are products

and have their birth, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of

the Divinity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of

the created being, of whose essence it is to have limits. (Theod.

382-391, 398, 395.)

  48. In God there is Power, which is the source of all, also

Knowledge, whose content is the variety of the ideas, and finally

Will, which makes changes or products according to the principle of

the best. (Theod. 7, 149, 150.) These characteristics correspond to

what in the created Monads forms the ground or basis, to the faculty

of Perception and to the faculty of Appetition. But in God these

attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect; and in the created

Monads or the Entelechies (or perfectihabiae, as Hermolaus Barbarus

translated the word) there are only imitations of these attributes,

according to the degree of perfection of the Monad. (Theod. 87.)

  49. A created thing is said to act outwardly in so far as it has

perfection, and to suffer [or be passive, patir] in relation to

another, in so far as it is imperfect. Thus activity [action] is

attributed to a Monad, in so far as it has distinct perceptions, and

passivity [passion] in so far as its perceptions are confused. (Theod.

32, 66, 386.)

  50. And one created thing is more perfect than another, in this,

that there is found in the more perfect that which serves to explain a

priori what takes place in the less perfect, and it is on this account

that the former is said to act upon the latter.

  51. But in simple substances the influence of one Monad upon another

is only ideal, and it can have its effect only through the mediation

of God, in so far as in the ideas of God any Monad rightly claims that

God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should

have regard to it. For since one created Monad cannot have any

physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only by this

means that the one can be dependent upon the other. (Theod. 9, 54, 65,

66, 201. Abrege, Object. 3.)

  52. Accordingly, among created things, activities and passivities

are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each

reasons which oblige Him to adapt the other to it, and consequently

what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of

view; active in so far as what we distinctly know in it serves to

explain [rendre raison de] what takes place in another, and passive in

so far as the explanation [raison] of what takes place in it is to

be found in that which is distinctly known in another. (Theod. 66.)

  53. Now, as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite number of

possible universes, and as only one of them can be actual, there

must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which leads Him

to decide upon one rather than another. (Theod. 8, 10, 44, 173, 196

sqq., 225, 414-416.)

  54. And this reason can be found only in the fitness [convenance],

or in the degrees of perfection, that these worlds possess, since each

possible thing has the right to aspire to existence in proportion to

the amount of perfection it contains in germ. (Theod. 74, 167, 350,

201, 130, 352, 345 sqq., 354.)

  55. Thus the actual existence of the best that wisdom makes known to

God is due to this, that His goodness makes Him choose it, and His

power makes Him produce it. (Theod. 8, 78, 80, 84, 119, 204, 206, 208.

Abrege, Object. 1 and 8.)

  56. Now this connexion or adaptation of all created things to each

and of each to all, means that each simple substance has relations

which express all the others, and, consequently, that it is a

perpetual living mirror of the universe. (Theod. 130, 360.)

  57. And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears

quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects

[perspectivement]; even so, as a result of the infinite number of

simple substances, it is as if there were so many different universes,

which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects [perspectives] of a single

universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad.

(Theod. 147.)

  58. And by this means there is obtained as great variety as

possible, along with the greatest possible order; that is to say, it

is the way to get as much perfection as possible. (Theod. 120, 124,

241 sqq., 214, 243, 275.)

  59. Besides, no hypothesis but this (which I venture to call proved)

fittingly exalts the greatness of God; and this Monsieur Bayle

recognized when, in his Dictionary (article Rorarius), he raised

objections to it, in which indeed he was inclined to think that I

was attributing too much to God- more than it is possible to

attribute. But he was unable to give any reason which could show the

impossibility of this universal harmony, according to which every

substance exactly expresses all others through the relations it has

with them.

  60. Further, in what I have just said there may be seen the

reasons a priori why things could not be otherwise than they are.

For God in regulating the whole has had regard to each part, and in

particular to each Monad, whose nature being to represent, nothing can

confine it to the representing of only one part of things; though it

is true that this representation is merely confused as regards the

variety of particular things [le detail] in the whole universe, and

can be distinct only as regards a small part of things, namely,

those which are either nearest or greatest in relation to each of

the Monads; otherwise each Monad would be a deity. It is not as

regards their object, but as regards the different ways in which

they have knowledge of their object, that the Monads are limited. In a

confused way they all strive after [vont a] the infinite, the whole;

but they are limited and differentiated through the degrees of their

distinct perceptions.

  61. And compounds are in this respect analogous with [symbolisent

avec] simple substances. For all is a plenum (and thus all matter is

connected together) and in the plenum every motion has an effect

upon distant bodies in proportion to their distance, so that each body

not only is affected by those which are in contact with it and in some

way feels the effect of everything that happens to them, but also is

mediately affected by bodies adjoining those with which it itself is

in immediate contact. Wherefore it follows that this

inter-communication of things extends to any distance, however

great. And consequently every body feels the effect of all that

takes place in the universe, so that he who sees all might read in

each what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened or shall

happen, observing in the present that which is far off as well in time

as in place: sympnoia panta, as Hippocrates said. But a soul can

read in itself only that which is there represented distinctly; it

cannot all at once unroll everything that is enfolded in it, for its

complexity is infinite.

  62. Thus, although each created Monad represents the whole universe,

it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it,

and of which it is the entelechy; and as this body expresses the whole

universe through the connexion of all matter in the plenum, the soul

also represents the whole universe in representing this body, which

belongs to it in a special way. (Theod. 400.)

  63. The body belonging to a Monad (which is its entelechy or its

soul) constitutes along with the entelechy what may be called a living

being, and along with the soul what is called an animal. Now this body

of living being or of an animal is always organic; for, as every Monad

is, in its own way, a mirror of the universe, and as the universe is

ruled according to a perfect order, there must also be order in that

which represents it, i.e. in the perceptions of the soul, and

consequently there must be order in the body, through which the

universe is represented in the soul. (Theod. 403.)

  64. Thus the organic body of each living being is a kind of divine

machine or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all

artificial automata. For a machine made by the skill of man is not a

machine in each of its parts. For instance, the tooth of a brass wheel

has parts or fragments which for us are not artificial products, and

which do not have the special characteristics of the machine, for they

give no indication of the use for which the wheel was intended. But

the machines of nature, namely, living bodies, are still machines in

their smallest parts ad infinitum. It is this that constitutes the

difference between nature and art, that is to say, between the

divine art and ours. (Theod. 134, 146, 194, 403.)

  65. And the Author of nature has been able to employ this divine and

infinitely wonderful power of art, because each portion of matter is

not only infinitely divisible, as the ancients observed, but is also

actually subdivided without end, each part into further parts, of

which each has some motion of its own; otherwise it would be

impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe.

(Theod. Prelim., Disc. de la Conform. 70, and 195.)

  66. Whence it appears that in the smallest particle of matter

there is a world of creatures, living beings, animals, entelechies,

souls.

  67. Each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of

plants and like a pond full of fishes. But each branch of every plant,

each member of every animal, each drop of its liquid parts is also

some such garden or pond.

  68. And though the earth and the air which are between the plants of

the garden, or the water which is between the fish of the pond, be

neither plant nor fish; yet they also contain plants and fishes, but

mostly so minute as to be imperceptible to us.

  69. Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in

the universe, no chaos, no confusion save in appearance, somewhat as

it might appear to be in a pond at a distance, in which one would

see a confused movement and, as it were, a swarming of fish in the

pond, without separately distinguishing the fish themselves. (Theod.

Pref. [E. 475 b; 477 b; G. vi. 40, 44].)

  70. Hence it appears that each living body has a dominant entelechy,

which in an animal is the soul; but the members of this living body

are full of other living beings, plants, animals, each of which has

also its dominant entelechy or soul.

  71. But it must not be imagined, as has been done by some who have

misunderstood my thought, that each soul has a quantity or portion

of matter belonging exclusively to itself or attached to it for

ever, and that it consequently owns other inferior living beings,

which are devoted for ever to its service. For all bodies are in a

perpetual flux like rivers, and parts are entering into them and

passing out of them continually.

  72. Thus the soul changes its body only by degrees, little by

little, so that it is never all at once deprived of all its organs;

and there is often metamorphosis in animals, but never

metempsychosis or transmigration of souls; nor are there souls

entirely separate [from bodies] nor unembodied spirits [genies sans

corps]. God alone is completely without body. (Theod. 90, 124.)

  73. It also follows from this that there never is absolute birth

[generation] nor complete death, in the strict sense, consisting in

the separation of the soul from the body. What we call births

[generations] are developments and growths, while what we call

deaths are envelopments and diminutions.

  74. Philosophers have been much perplexed about the origin of forms,

entelechies, or souls; but nowadays it has become known, through

careful studies of plants, insects, and animals, that the organic

bodies of nature are never products of chaos or putrefaction, but

always come from seeds, in which there was undoubtedly some

preformation; and it is held that not only the organic body was

already there before conception, but also a soul in this body, and, in

short, the animal itself; and that by means of conception this

animal has merely been prepared for the great transformation

involved in its becoming an animal of another kind. Something like

this is indeed seen apart from birth [generation], as when worms

become flies and caterpillars become butterflies. (Theod. 86, 89.

Pref. [E. 475 b; G. vi. 40 sqq.]; 90, 187, 188, 403, 86, 397.)

  75. The animals, of which some are raised by means of conception

to the rank of larger animals, may be called spermatic, but those

among them which are not so raised but remain in their own kind

(that is, the majority) are born, multiply, and are destroyed like the

large animals, and it is only a few chosen ones [elus] that pass to

a greater theatre.

  76. But this is only half of the truth, and accordingly I hold

that if an animal never comes into being by natural means

[naturellement], no more does it come to an end by natural means;

and that not only will there be no birth [generation], but also no

complete destruction or death in the strict sense. And these

reasonings, made a posteriori and drawn from experience are in perfect

agreement with my principles deduced a priori, as above. (Theod. 90.)

  77. Thus it may be said that not only the soul (mirror of an

indestructible universe) is indestructible, but also the animal

itself, though its mechanism [machine] may often perish in part and

take off or put on an organic slough [des depouilles organiques].

  78. These principles have given me a way of explaining naturally the

union or rather the mutual agreement [conformite] of the soul and

the organic body. The soul follows its own laws, and the body likewise

follows its own laws; and they agree with each other in virtue of

the pre-established harmony between all substances, since they are all

representations of one and the same universe. (Pref. [E. 475 a; G. vi.

39]; Theod. 340, 352, 353, 358.)

  79. Souls act according to the laws of final causes through

appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of

efficient causes or motions. And the two realms, that of efficient

causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with one another.

  80. Descartes recognized that souls cannot impart any force to

bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in

matter. Nevertheless he was of opinion that the soul could change

the direction of bodies. But that is because in his time it was not

known that there is a law of nature which affirms also the

conservation of the same total direction in matter. Had Descartes

noticed this he would have come upon my system of pre-established

harmony. (Pref. [E. 477 a; G. vi. 44]; Theod. 22, 59, 60, 61, 63,

66, 345, 346 sqq., 354, 355.)

  81. According to this system bodies act as if (to suppose the

impossible) there were no souls, and souls act as if there were no

bodies, and both act as if each influenced the other.

  82. As regards minds [esprits] or rational souls, though I find that

what I have just been saying is true of all living beings and

animals (namely that animals and souls come into being when the

world begins and no more come to an end that the world does), yet

there is this peculiarity in rational animals, that their spermatic

animalcules, so long as they are only spermatic, have merely

ordinary or sensuous [sensitive] souls; but when those which are

chosen [elus], so to speak, attain to human nature through an actual

conception, their sensuous souls are raised to the rank of reason

and to the prerogative of minds [esprits]. (Theod. 91, 397.)

  83. Among other differences which exist between ordinary souls and

minds [esprits], some of which differences I have already noted, there

is also this: that souls in general are living mirrors or images of

the universe of created things, but that minds are also images of

the Deity or Author of nature Himself, capable of knowing the system

of the universe, and to some extent of imitating it through

architectonic ensamples [echantillons], each mind being like a small

divinity in its own sphere. (Theod. 147.)

  84. It is this that enables spirits [or minds- esprits] to enter

into a kind of fellowship with God, and brings it about that in

relation to them He is not only what an inventor is to his machine

(which is the relation of God to other created things), but also

what a prince is to his subjects, and, indeed, what a father is to his

children.

  85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the totality [assemblage]

of all spirits [esprits] must compose the City of God, that is to say,

the most perfect State that is possible, under the most perfect of

Monarchs. (Theod. 146; Abrege, Object. 2.)

  86. This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral

world in the natural world, and is the most exalted and most divine

among the works of God; and it is in it that the glory of God really

consists, for He would have no glory were not His greatness and His

goodness known and admired by spirits [esprits]. It is also in

relation to this divine City that God specially has goodness, while

His wisdom and His power are manifested everywhere. (Theod. 146;

Abrege, Object. 2.)

  87. As we have shown above that there is a perfect harmony between

the two realms in nature, one of efficient, and the other of final

causes, we should here notice also another harmony between the

physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace, that is to say,

between God, considered as Architect of the mechanism [machine] of the

universe and God considered as Monarch of the divine City of spirits

[esprits]. (Theod. 62, 74, 118, 248, 112, 130, 247.)

  88. A result of this harmony is that things lead to grace by the

very ways of nature, and that this globe, for instance, must be

destroyed and renewed by natural means at the very time when the

government of spirits requires it, for the punishment of some and

the reward of others. (Theod. 18 sqq., 110, 244, 245, 340.)

  89. It may also be said that God as Architect satisfies in all

respects God as Lawgiver, and thus that sins must bear their penalty

with them, through the order of nature, and even in virtue of the

mechanical structure of things; and similarly that noble actions

will attain their rewards by ways which, on the bodily side, are

mechanical, although this cannot and ought not always to happen

immediately.

  90. Finally, under this perfect government no good action would be

unrewarded and no bad one unpunished, and all should issue in the

well-being of the good, that is to say, of those who are not

malcontents in this great state, but who trust in Providence, after

having done their duty, and who love and imitate, as is meet, the

Author of all good, finding pleasure in the contemplation of His

perfections, as is the way of genuine 'pure love,' which takes

pleasure in the happiness of the beloved. This it is which leads

wise and virtuous people to devote their energies to everything

which appears in harmony with the presumptive or antecedent will of

God, and yet makes them content with what God actually brings to

pass by His secret, consequent and positive [decisive] will,

recognizing that if we could sufficiently understand the order of

the universe, we should find that it exceeds all the desires of the

wisest men, and that it is impossible to make it better than it is,

not only as a whole and in general but also for ourselves in

particular, if we are attached, as we ought to be, to the Author of

all, not only as to the architect and efficient cause of our being,

but as to our master and to the final cause, which ought to be the

whole aim of our will, and which can alone make our happiness. (Theod.

134, 278. Pref. [E. 469; G. vi. 27, 28].)



                              THE END

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